Two aspects of identity as determinants of human moral development

Dwa aspekty tożsamości jako uwarunkowania rozwoju moralnego

Summary
The first part of article suggests that it should move away from the concept of Spencer, because it doesn't precise the beginning and the end of development. Then proposes a different definition based on the distinction in a man of two identities: congenital and acquired. At the beginning of the development there must be a genetically written project that is an active information. Then development can be described as becoming what one already is. And the end of the development one can describe as fulfillment of this project and acting according of it. As regards moral development it can be said that one is fully developed when he/she fulfills his/her duties and feels free. These considerations allow to describe the relationship between identity and moral behavior. Identity is regarded as inborn and acquired. The latter is acquired from environment, but an individual can freely choose between important persons and form one's own identity. Moral identity is a source of moral behavior and consists of two aspects: an innate capability of good actions and an acquired concept of what is good. Moral identity emerges from environment. If this environment is helpful, then moral identity is positive too: a man regards himself as good and acts according to this conviction.

Streszczenie
W odniesieniu do rozwoju moralnego, można powiedzieć, że człowiek jest w pełni rozwinięty, gdy działa zgodnie z tym, kim jest (ze swoją tożsamością) i spełnia swoje obowiązki. Tożsamość występuje jako wrodzona i nabyte. Ta ostatnia jest nabywana od środowiska, ale jednostka może swobodnie wybierać kto będzie dla niej osobą znaczącą i w ten sposób formować swoją tożsamość. Tożsamość moralna jest źródłem moralnego zachowania i ma też dwa aspekty: wrodzona zdolność do dobrego działania oraz nabyte pojęcie o tym, co jest dobre. Tożsamość moralna kształtuje się poprzez kontakty z otoczeniem. Jeśli jest ono pomocne, wtedy tożsamość moralna jest też pozytywna: człowiek widzi siebie jako dobrego i działa zgodnie z tym przekonaniem.

Keywords: moral development, moral identity, innate and acquired identity, definition of development, purpose of development, active information in development

Słowa kluczowe: rozwój moralny, tożsamość moralna, tożsamość wrodzona i nabyte, definicja rozwoju, cel rozwoju człowieka, aktywna informacja
Part one. What is development?

Introduction

«Development» is one of the basic concepts in philosophy, psychology, pedagogy, economics, and actually in all of contemporary culture, because the whole reality: social or nature; material or immaterial, it is now considered as developing. No doubt this is influenced by the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), according to which reality is a part (aspect) of a growing spirit (absolute). The impact of that thinking has next been improved thanks to the C.R. Darwin’s (1809-1882) theory of evolution, rejecting the immutability of species. Then English philosopher H. Spencer (1820-1903) tried to justify that the whole universe is subject to evolution that is progressive and systematic diversification of parts that make up the specified order. According to him, all systems in the world and the world as a whole pass from the state of chaos to the organized unity to form the progress. Changes in the world are so widely interpreted as development, and development is understood as suggested by Spencer. The process of discovery of this conception is described as follows:

In 1851 Spencer read a review of W.B. Carpenter’s Principles of Physiology. In his autobiography half a century later, Spencer describes this review as an „incident of moment” in his intellectual life. The review introduced him to the decades old idea of K.E. von Baer, (...) that all living organisms develop from a condition of homogeneity to one of increasing heterogeneity. The „incident of moment” was Spencer’s recognition that this formula could be applied to the evolution of inorganic no less than to organic material, and to individuals today no less than to species in the past. Indeed, the more he thought about it, the more he concluded it could be applied to everything! (...) He had discovered, he thought, one of the most fundamental principles of nature (Egan, The Flaw in Progressivism. Chapter 3: Part 1. Introduction).

Another author says the same thing:
Seizing on an idea which was already in the air and to which Darwin gave an empirical basis in a restricted field, Spencer turned it into the key-idea of a synoptic vision of the world and of human life and conduct, an optimistic vision which appeared to justify nineteenth-century belief in human progress and which made of Spencer one of the major prophets’ of an era (Copleston, 1994, p. 121).

As regards the practical application of these ideas, it is needed to say that Spencer laid out general principles for intellectual education:

The first principle is that „we should proceed from the simple to the complex.” This, as he acknowledges, is a principle that has always
been accepted in some degree. But Spencer elaborated a new sense in which it should be understood: “The mind develops. Like all things that develop it progresses from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. (…) The second principle is that “the development of the mind, as all other development, is an advance from the indefinite to the definite” (1911, p. 133-134). Spencer believed that from original chaos order gradually emerged; an idea he carries over to the child’s mind in his belief that children’s cognition is indefinite, chaotic, vague and gradually becomes more definite, ordered, and clear (Egan, The Flaw in Progressivism. Chapter 1: Part 1. Introduction).

Let us express it with words of very Spencer:

It is settled beyond dispute that organic progress consists in a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. Now, we propose in the first place to show, that this law of organic progress is the law of all progress. (…) From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of civilisation, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous is that in which Progress essentially consists (Spencer, 1891, p. 10).

We believe we have shown beyond question, that that which the German physiologists have found to be the law of organic development, is the law of all development. The advance from the simple to the complex, through a process of successive differentiations, is seen alike in the earliest changes of the Universe to which we can reason our way back; and in the earliest changes which we can inductively establish; it is seen in the geologic and climatic evolution of the Earth, and of every single organism on its surface; it is seen in the evolution of Humanity, whether contemplated in the civilised individual, or in the aggregation of races; it is seen in the evolution of Society in respect alike of its political, its religious, and its economical organisation; and it is seen in the evolution of all those endless concrete and abstract products of human activity which constitute the environment of our daily life. From the remotest past which Science can fathom, up to the novelties of yesterday, that in which Progress essentially consists, is the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous (Spencer 1891, p. 35).

Such vision of reality dominates in modern science and in contemporary pedagogy and psychology as well. We look at the world then with the eyes of Spencer. For example, Spencer’s concepts were developed by J. Piaget:

“Piaget’s progress-dominated theory also leads to his supporting those familiar Spencerian principles about moving from the simple to the complex” (Egan, The Flaw in Progressivism. Chapter 3: Part 2. Into the twentieth century with Jean Piaget).
“One needn’t inquire very earnestly to see practices in schools today that are direct implementations of Spencer’s and/or Piaget’s ideas about development” (Egan, The Flaw in Progressivism. Chapter 3: Part 2. Into the twentieth century with Jean Piaget).

Spencer’s vision and definition of development are now commonly accepted, as is seen in definitions of development from English dictionaries:

“The process of an individual organism growing organically; a purely biological unfoldling of events involved in an organism changing gradually from a simple to a more complex level (emphasis – TN)”.

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/development

“The natural progression from a previous, simpler, or embryonic stage to a later, more complex, or adult stage” (emphasis – TN)”.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/development

“Developmental changes are often systematic, progressive and orderly. They usually follow a pattern, proceeding from general to specific, and from simple to complex and integrated levels of functioning (emphasis – TN).”

http://www.nios.ac.in/media/documents/secpsycour/English/Chapter-9.pdf

Are these definitions fully adequate? Does the definition given by Spencer correctly capture the essence of the development? Let’s see that the development must somewhere begin and must somewhere end, however above definitions say nothing about so important questions. Then there is a need to elaborate this problem anew, because a lot depends on the definition of development: “The first difficulty encountered when one wants to determine the temporal boundaries of development is the vagueness of the definition of development. Development is so imprecisely defined, if at all, that it is almost impossible to assess what processes and mechanisms are or are not part of development” (Laplane, 2011, p. 48).

The condition of understanding some process is establishing its start (cause) and the end (purpose). Hence we have two questions:

1. What is the beginning of this process?
2. What is the end of this process?

The both questions I will try to explain in my own investigations. How to make a search? The key here is to capture the nature of development. So first – in this article – are mentioned the different meanings of the term “development”. Then I try to determine how we should define the development, arguing that it must be the initial understanding, how development differs from other processes; so one needs to determine initial assumptions: what change can be considered as developmental or what assumptions on the development it is difficult to give up? Above all one should determine, what the development differs from the sequence of any changes. By this I will determine what is the most important in this process and in the definition of development, i.e. to which processes this concept may be applied. Then I will move on to discussion concerning the beginning and the
direction (purpose) of the development. In the end I will give my own definition and indicate what psychological problems it helps to solve, i.e. what are its practical consequences for the developmental psychology.

Investigations of this type can make a big difference, because an entire organization of the society, and especially an education and upbringing system actually depend on the definition of the development: “The description, explanation, and enhancement of development in individuals and groups of individuals are seen as important goals of scientific inquiry in most of the social, behavioral, and life sciences” (Staudinger, Lindenberger, 2003, p. 1).

Let’s begin by listing the various situations in which this term is used.

The different meanings of the term «development»

The word «development» is a wildcard, however it is possible to put these different meanings in broader categories. If we take into account two factors: end and purpose; there would be possible four combinations of them in different processes:

- there is no end (finish) and no purpose,
- there is an end (finish) but no purpose,
- there is no end (finish) but there is a purpose,
- there are both: end (finish) and purpose.

It is not difficult to give examples for these combinations:

- The first: any change, for example: „development of situation (action)”, „development of psychology”, „development of the United States”, „development of sport”, „development of trade (business)”, „development of football”, „development of film”, „development of tourism”.

In this sense, everything what is in some way changing is developing. One cannot specify neither the end nor purpose and the specifics of this process. There one cannot also determine whether there is something more or less developed because of lack of the criterion of value of these changes. I guess that as a criterion for the development in these cases only time lapse is used: the more is something late, the more is developed.

- The second: enlargement, growth, intensifying, accumulation, expansion, broadening, for example: „development of a city”, „development of a disease”, „development of a fire”; „development of storm clouds”.

In these expressions the development is understood as the rather quantitative change, having its end, but not having the purpose.

- The third: melioration, improvement, progress, advancement, for example: „agricultural development”, „development of higher education”, „development of relation”, „development of communication”, „development of economy”, „development of writing”, „development of social policy”, „development of the Inter-
net”, „development of a library”, „development of a firm (company)”, „development of the Faculty of Humanities”, „development of technology”.

In this sense something might be better or worse. The more is something developed, the more is better; it achieves more advanced or mature stage, then an evaluation (assessing) is possible. The development in this meaning is a qualitative change and something good, what it is worthwhile trying to achieve. However there is not a clearly defined end of this process, but there is a kind of a purpose, and then it is possible to talk about the excellence of something, although not exactly defined. In this meaning everything what is in some sense – rather quantitative – bigger, more numerous, embracing more elements, that is more developed.

– The fourth: achieving the final, target, excellent or perfect form in advance designated in outline, for example: «development of an egg”, «development of a flower”, «development of an insect”, “development of a fetus”, “mental development” and “human development”.

Development in this meaning is not only a change, but the intentional, targeted change as well. The end of this process is clear too. That’s why stages of development are predictable. It is so only in this meaning. In this sense it is possible to tell- about the fullness of development, or the excellence of what is being developed. The development is then a predictable process, as far as one knows the plan or idea, according to which this development is taking place. The development is understood then as a disclosure of hidden but active possibilities. In this sense is stressed most apparently that what is more developed is better.

The problem is that Spencer’s definition does not capture the aspect of the value of the development what is stressed in the last meaning. And I think it is the most adequate understanding of this term. Let’s now try to describe more exactly the beginning and the end of this process. If the development has to be something more than just the change (if it is not so that everything what is changing is developing), therefore it must be targeted, intentional (deliberate, scheduled) process. Not every change is development; but each development is a change. But from where does this change come? – From inside. Then what is the most distinctive in a developing being? – It is spontaneity.

Spontaneity of development

It seems then that the most important thing for the correct definition of development would be just to take into account the spontaneity of it. The source of change and development are entered into the developing being. The main factors and driving forces of developmental changes are inside developing being, so they decide about their autonomous nature. What develops has primarily in themselves the source of their changes, but according to Spencer, at the beginning of development is a chaos. Then chaos would have to be something creative, but
then it’s unlikely it would be only chaos. Does an order and value (target) emerge from chaos itself? If not, then where do ordering factors come from?

E. Gilson (2009, p. 59) rightly argues that development is un-rolling of the in-rolled and de-velopment of the en-veloped. I suppose then, that at the beginning of development must be a genetically encoded plan, design or project. The develop-ment is an implementation (realisation) of this plan which must be in some way active. In the other way we can say that development is a realization of capacities:

Traditional definition offers an immediate answer to the problem examined here, that of the temporal and spatial boundaries of development. Temporally, development starts with fertilization and ends at adulthood – usually defined as the stage at which the reproductive capacity has been acquired. Spatially, what develops is an organism, seen as the product of internal, preexisting capacities found in the egg (Pradeu, Laplane, Morange, Nicoglou, Vervoort, 2011, p. 1).

The organism is then “product of internal capacities” – they are primarily given and active. The environment is condition to disclosure those preexisting capa-cities, but cannot introduce anything essentially new. It is impossible to gain any abilities, which previously in embryonic stage were not owned. Then the problem arises: what is the relation between the plan and the preexisting capacities? What is the nature of these capacities?

If a plan is something active, then those capacities must be active in any way as well. Then: what is the deepest source of development? If development is an intentional process, then it is steered by information. This information is written in genes. But the problem is that genes alone in themselves aren’t active. They are only carriers, tools of the transmission of information. That’s why we need a con-ception of active and formative information, which acts by genes, with their help. That conception was introduced to science by David Bohm:

“Towards the end of the 1980s David Bohm introduced the notion of Active Information into his Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory. His idea was to use the activity of information as a way of explaining the actual nature of quantum processes and, in particular, the way in which a single physical outcome emerges out of a multiplicity of possibilities” (Peat. Active Information, Meaning and Form. Introduction).

What is a role of this information? Does it explain all behavior of living being? No, it only steered of change:

“Information itself does not push the ship, rather it „in-forms” the gross ener-gy of the engines. Information therefore allows a distinction to be made between what could be called raw or „un-formed” energy and a more subtle energy, an activity that can be identified with information. This information acts on raw energy to give it form” (Peat. Active Information, Meaning and Form. Information).
In that case it is necessary to accept and to make an assumption, that there are two kinds of energy in the living being: the “un-formed” energy coming from eating food (the metabolism) and the steering energy controlling processes of the organism, coming from inside of this organism. F. David Peat suggested this very clearly:

That, I believe, is what is most fascinating about Bohm’s interpretation: that it attempts to add the activity of information to our notions of matter and energy. It suggests that form has an activity of its own. In particular it in-forms, or gives form to, energy.

Hence information is not something passive that is carried by a book, telephone line or radio wave, but an actual activity in nature, a physical form, albeit subtle, that has its interaction with matter and energy. And just as matter and energy are mutually convertible, the same may be true of matter-energy and information (Peat. Active information).

Then we have three notions: project (plan) – abilities (capacities) – active information. What are the relations between them? What reality are they describing? I think that in this place it will be useful to enter the metaphor of the development as construction of a tool. In order to understand and describe this process we must accept that at the beginning of the development there must be some kind of intentional action that is activity, active plan; that is energy plus purpose. But this energy is inactive; that means potentially active (cfr. Bohm 1990, p. 279), it needs a tool. For example: somebody wants to do something but he/she needs some devices to do it. It is like gardening. Someone wants to garden but has no tools for it. He/she is able to do gardening because he/she has knowledge and intention of gardening but simultaneously he/she is not able to do it because he/she has no tools. Then construction of the tools we can compare with development of a living being. At the beginning there is a project (active information) - how this tool should look like and act – then in consequence, thanks to that tool, the gardener has ability to act in intended way. This ability is more and more better (bigger) during modifying the tool. The better the tool, the easier is operation. The active information has a capability to act but this capability is increasing during the construction of the tool. Then at the beginning of development an action (active information) is given (ready); but it is needed to form a tool for this action. The result of development of the tool is then freedom of agent. During the development active information (plan, project) builds itself a tool with available materials acquired from environment.

Then development has its goal.

Purposefulness (intentionality) of the development

Is the development a purposeful process? Some says, that not:

By ‘development’ we mean all the changes to a living being’s whole
phenotype, or to one of its phenotypic modules, over its lifespan. In this way, we emphasize both a nonadult-centric and a non-teleological idea of development. Development is not to be intended as the process towards the adult stage of a living being, but any phenotypic change starting from a preceding phenotype during its lifespan (...) development is a process from a given living being’s phenotype and not toward a given phenotype. (...) We accept the definition proposed by those evo-devo biologists (for instance, Minelli 2003) who consider development as the set of modifications occurring over the entire lifespan of a living being. (Boniolo, Testa. 2012, p. 282-283).

As we can see authors use the first concept of development: if something changes, then it evolves. But such understanding is useless in describing of the development’s assistance. In consequence there are other positions too:

“Most theories of development, whether they are psychological, philosophical, or religious, presuppose a goal or endpoint to the development process, an ideal to be achieved, as well as a way of life to achieve it. (...) This is particularly true of hierarchical theories of development that need an understanding of what lies at the top of the hierarchy” (Nelson, 2009, p. 213).

The problem, whether the development is moving in a specified direction, is the subject of disputes. It is a problem of teleological aspects of development. The development is usually bundled with progress as the process of progressive change, towards final objectives or endpoints, assessed usually positively. Nobody wants then to be – or to be named as – undeveloped. In this approach, the identification of certain endpoints, to which changes are intended, should be treated as a necessity. The lack of it makes the assessment of stages of the development impossible. Endpoints must be specified in order to be able to evaluate the correctness of the development. This is the same idea as of R. Spaemann:

“Only when we have a bright light or clear concept of maturity specific to the species of living beings we can interpret its change as progress. The concept of progress cannot be a predicate which does not require further interpretation” (Spaemann 2012, p. 271). The same is said by other author:

There is no neutral standpoint, and no description could occur without a positing of endpoints. The question is what one would possibly describe if one did not understand development as tending toward some specified end? If one wishes to describe/explain the course of acquiring language, then adult language is, of necessity, the endpoint. No description of the language of the child would be possible without this ideal endpoint. In a similar fashion, if one wishes to describe/explain the transformational development of reasoning, thought, problem solving, personality, or anything, a conceptual endpoint must serve as the ideal ultimate model. (Overton, 2006, p. 26).
So what is the purpose of the development? The purpose (aim, goal) is, by definition, a vision of intended, but still unrealized project or state. The purpose may not be something quite unknown or undetermined. What is this aim?

If the development is a spontaneous process, controlled by an active information, then the goal of development must be recorded in this information. We must say then, that aim of development is included in the primary project. If at the beginning of the development there is a plan or project then endpoint of that process will be realization of that project. The goal (aim) of acting and development of living being is in their inside; in their genes. In order to give an answer as for purpose of development it is necessary properly discover (find) an action, in which the developing being finds its fulfillment.

It is just like the tool. The purpose for which it is built, is to fulfill the appropriate action. In humans a sign or a symptom of the proper operation will be a sense of freedom. So is the essence of development differentiation and integration? Does Spencer’s conception properly reflect the nature of development? Is Spencer right?

In this work I want to propose an outline of the philosophical theory that defines the standard for development. Not more integration but more freedom is the higher stage of development. If we know where the development begins and when it ends, what the definition we can offer?

Proposed definition of development

Especially in the humanistic psychology as an aim of development is taken the carrying out one’s capabilities and becoming what a man can be:

“The person-centered notion of development is the discovery and unfolding of innate qualities, of the inner good and inborn health of the human being, and the search for personal fulfillment and meaning. Successful development means being all one can be. Individuals are seen as proactive, rational, self-aware, and complex; they possess freedom and dignity, and carry the responsibility to find meaning for their lives. There is the assumption of a tendency toward positive values and a strong emphasis on inner states and feelings. Performance, skills, achievements, tasks, and responsibilities and duties are not satisfying in themselves, but important as means to inner growth, awareness, happiness, and health” (Kuchinke, 1999, p. 148).

I agree with these opinions in general, but it is impossible “being all one can be”.

I can be for example a teacher, miner, tailor, policeman, postman and so on, but it does not mean that in every one from this jobs I can be free because I don’t want to be policeman or miner. Therefore, development can be defined as the actualization of such possibilities which are designed in the genetic code. In this code it is written and established who I am. One can therefore say that the deve-
Development is becoming oneself, either: becoming what someone already potentially is, that is actualization of their capabilities. In case of growth of plants and animals it is enough to indicate that at the beginning of the development are genetically encoded capabilities that reveal themselves in the appropriate environment. It is possible also to say that a development is growing up to action typical of oneself, or: development is improving the tools for proper (suitable) operation.

If development is becoming what somebody actually is, strictly speaking can develop only individual living beings. They only have in their inside a source and target of their changes. The use of the term „development” to other realities is either a metaphor or abuse, and these are phenomena that are acceptable in poetry, but should not have a place in science.

What are the practical consequences of such definition of development?

Consequences for developmental psychology

One should adopt the methodological assumption, that the concept should be defined only in a context. In our case, this context would be the following sentences, rather clearly understood:

“The development has its beginning and the end”.

“Development – especially of a man – should be supported.”

“It, what is developed, is in some way better than what is undeveloped.”

“Underdevelopment is something wrong, which must be prevented.”

“One can be more or less developed.”

I put the question then: in such a way is the term “development” understood in these sentences? What is the human development, if it is something good, what should be promoted? The development is assessed positively: any developmental change is a change for the better. If underdevelopment is a fault, something wrong; something that one needs to prevent, then development must be something favorable, which should be promoted.

The abandonment of this principle (assumptions) would introduce a lot of problems, especially in education and upbringing, which rely on supporting the development. That is because development of a man is something good, which should be supported. That is a universally adopted belief, nobody is questioning it. But, if development of a man is an intentional process, then what aim should we propose to developing man? Be heterogeneous, definite, ordered, clear and complex – as Spencer proposed? Can we put this goal to our children or students? Of course, we can say to them: be mature, be fully developed, but what’s that supposed to mean? I do not think that such wording will help someone in his/her development. It’s hard to use this concept without reservation to describe human development. It’s easy to see the weaknesses of this definition, so it seems that – at
least in psychology – it is worth to look for a better definition which will facilitate the understanding and supporting of this process.

First of all let’s see that defining development as realization of abilities, as regards human, such a determination is not enough.

For example, potentially, better or worse – what I have said earlier – I can perform almost any profession, but that does not mean that I will be really developed in any job. Therefore, development can be described as actualization of essential possibilities. And which ones are essential? – Those which cause a feeling of freedom and fulfillment (self-realization). But should I be free without restrictions? Can I achieve the sense of fulfillment without close connections with other people? Certainly, not. I want to be free in relation with other people and this is possible only when I am good for them. Then, if we consider the ability of entering into close relationships with other people as the purpose of human development; the following definition will be better: the development is becoming what it should be or a development is becoming it, with whom (with what) it is necessary to be, or: a development is becoming what one is supposed to be.

This definition takes into account the deliberate targeting and – at the same time – the freedom of a man, which itself is able, however only within certain limits, to decide the direction of its development, and can fully develop when someone properly specify their most important social duties. These obligations depend on the environment, which – despite the effort to preserve one’s autonomy – it is necessary to adjust. If it was differently, it wouldn’t be worthwhile to support the development. The use of the term “supporting of the development” only makes sense when we consider the development as a special-purpose change in the direction of increasing value; development is something good: the more is someone developed, the more they are better.

If the development didn’t move in direction of more and more considerable value, it wouldn’t make sense assisting and supporting it. Could it be possible to support the development of a man having no – even if implicitly – following approach: “you should be able to do it” or “you should be such and such”? After all, for example, the whole education – from primary education to the doctoral studies – is based on identifying what skills a student should master; or: which tasks should one be able to resolve. It is then impossible in human relationships to resign from the concept of obligations (duties) and it cannot be missed in analyzing and promoting human development. It would be hard to analyze the development – especially of a man – without assessing. Then, in order to describe and evaluate the development of a man, we should know who the man is and how he/she should act. However, usage of the term „should” introduces an element of duty (obligation). Such term introduces normative aspects into psychology and therefore could give rise to much controversy. But it flows logically from the use of the term „supporting of development”. Supporting of development is helping others
to become who someone should be and do what they should do, which is to assist in achieving some standard (ideal). Does it mean we should introduce category of obligations to developmental psychology? Yes; anyway, it is already implemented and is expressed: „everyone should be developed”, or „it is good, if a man is developed”, or „development should be assisted”.

On this basis; on the basis of such - may be - unconscious but clearly thinking, are formulated different programs in enhancement of development. If these assumptions were false, then supporting of development wouldn’t make sense; it would be all the same if anyone is developed or not. It is evident then that it is necessary to introduce into developmental psychology the conceptions of duties (obligations) and of perfection: „All developmental psychology is, of necessity, normative, because, in one way or another, is dealing with the perfection and the possibility of achieving excellence. The validity of this principle has been lost in the default position adopted in developmental psychology in the twentieth century” (Vonèche, 2006, p. 35).

What more, if we define development as becoming what one should be then we can describe development in the category of developmental tasks that should be performed to move to a higher stage of development. This aspect is included in handbooks of developmental psychology; however, duty is not the primary category in these books.

Despite this, the term „developmental task” is already adopted in psychology and is easy to associate with the category of obligations: „If you want to develop, you should resolve the following problem...” This applies to the theory of developmental tasks of R. J. Havighurst and theory of E. H. Erikson stressing the need to resolve developmental crises.

In every period of life before each person and each situation are some tasks that are nothing else as their duties. There are always given to man some requirements, for example: „you should be good: child, student, athlete, son, worker, citizen, driver, husband, grandfather, etc.” Compliance with these requirements is a prerequisite for development; you need only to define what it means to „be good”. Here it can be – and is – a number of proposals. However, two criteria seem to be most important: autonomy of individuals and needs (requirements) of environment. Who can reconcile being oneself (authenticity, assertiveness, inner freedom) with satisfying the needs of other people, this one is fully developed. This is in line with some contemporary views:

“Contemporary psychologists often describe it (the goal of development – TN) as “successful aging” which includes (1) a low probability of disease and related disability, with a life style that minimizes risk factors for problems, (2) a high physical and cognitive functional capacity, and (3) an active engagement with life, including good interpersonal relationships, productive activity that is socially valued, and resilience or rapid recovery from stress and other life changes (Rowe & Kahn, 1997).
This defines the goal of human life in terms of health, productivity, and social adaptation. Other psychological definitions go beyond health and adaptation to consider human potential. For instance, Paul Baltes (e.g., Baltes & Staudinger, 2000) defines development as increasing _wisdom_, which involves our ability to coordinate personal resources such as tolerance or creativity so that we can pursue well-being and the meaningful good life for self and others” (Nelson, 2009, p. 274).

So we have two purposes of human development:
– functional capacity, productive activity, creativity, that is: freedom, autonomy, being oneself, assertiveness, self-expression, revealing one’s desires and capabilities,
– good interpersonal relationships, social adaptation, that is being in harmony, unity or agreement with others, adapting to them, meet their expectations.

From this it follows that human development is carried out correctly when it leads to the achievement of both those states. Therefore the more one feels free and is able to enter into close relationships with others; the more he/she is developed. It is also worth noting that the expectations of environment and preferred values are fundamental sources of what man considers as his/her duties. It seems then, that the objective of the development would be to achieve the autonomy, understood as the freedom of self-expression, revealing one’s capabilities, realization of one’s essential – properly interpreted – desires, while “properly interpreted” means “in a way that is beneficial for the environment”.

As a conclusion we can say that to be free and in good relations with environment is better aim of human development then: be heterogeneous, definite, ordered, clear and complex – as Spencer wanted.

This vision is in agreement with words of J. M. Nelson, who says that:
“Global goals of development could include happiness, a sense of completeness or well-being, reproductive success, achievement of one’s unique potential, a sense of meaning and purpose, and positive relationships or autonomous self-mastery (Ryff, 1989). Some goals may be more modest: becoming competent, functioning successfully within society, or simply shielding others from a toxic past (Kotre & Kotre, 1998).” (Nelson 2009, p. 214).

In psychology it is understood that the developmental task is a task appearing at a certain stage of human life, whose solution gives a sense of achievement and satisfaction, while un-execution of them leads to a sense of personal loss, disapproval from the public and the difficulties in the following next tasks. Exactly the same is true with obligations. So who is able actually to read out and fulfill his/her duties in the face of the environment and in fulfilling them to find sense of freedom, the one is mature and fully developed. In other words, it is service to other people according to one’s abilities correctly read out and educated.
Conclusion

What is development then? It seems to me that for further progress (development then improving) of the developmental psychology and other domains of science it is needed to move away from the concept of H. Spencer, pointing to a clear aim of the development and using the concept of potential but active abilities that “want” to be used.

At the beginning of development it cannot be chaos; it must be there something formed and active but like muffled and suppressed – exactly as in an egg, seed or germ.

Development is then achieving the final, excellent or perfect form in advance designated in outline. Exactly the same is true for human development. He or she also has the final form, determined by the genetic code, that is active information, and therefore development is becoming what he or she already is, which is becoming himself or herself. A sign of proper development is increasing freedom. That freedom is increased by feeling the fulfillment of one’s current developmental task. I hold the view that the inclusion of ethical concepts to psychological language will allow a more adequate description of the developmental processes engaged in the daily life of every man. In addition, statement that the freedom is a goal of development and not only adaptation, will certainly allow for better diagnosis and use of developmental potentials. As the developmental change we can then recognize everything that gives a sense of the use of one’s capabilities, achieve greater autonomy, or sense of being oneself. This is done through the practicing of new skills, however we need to add that because man is a social creature – it’s not about any skill, but only that which on the one hand, will give a sense of freedom and, on the other hand, allow for creative and positive inclusion in social relationships. It’s then hard to call a development what leads to immoral activities. A man cannot be really free if he or she harms others because in his or her inside there is innate desire to be close with other people and to be respected and appreciated by them.

What’s more, as is apparent from the preceding discussion, retarded (undeveloped) is one who does not feel free or is unable to find friends. This task is always current because we cannot once and for all achieve our freedom, or to secure a close relationship with others. Analyzing human development we should therefore pay attention to the developmental tasks not only in a big scale, as in theories of Havighurst and Erikson, but also in specific situations of every day, using to them categories: being oneself (assertiveness, autonomy) and taking account of the needs of others (caring, kindness). Who can express themselves in a given situation in a way that is useful to others, successfully resolves the current development task, and thus tends to peak (total, ultimate) development, namely to achieve the purpose of his or her life. One should teach children and teenagers such abilities aspiring for supporting their development.
The above considerations can be applied to the analysis and description of the moral development of man.

Part two. Two aspects of identity in moral development

Introduction

The concept of moral identity is an interesting theoretical proposal for analyzing moral problems and assisting human moral development. But there are some problems connected with it. For example, it isn’t clear in what way morality is linked to identity, that’s why “conceptual and empirical investigation into this issue is strongly urged” (Hardy, Carlo, 2005, p. 233; 245).

I suppose that in this situation it may be useful to distinguish between innate and acquired identities (or the two aspects of identity). I think that examination of moral identity is more important for description and determining the level of moral development than analysis of moral reasoning. More valuable is this proposal than Kohlberg’s (moral reasoning) or Piaget’s (autonomy or heteronomy). I therefore propose to elaborate on those ideas and offer a philosophical basis for this theory. In this article I want to discuss the following:

- What is identity?
- What are its aspects (elements); what does it consist of?
- What are the origins of identity?
- What is moral identity and what does it consist of?
- What are the origins of moral identity?
- How can it be developed?

I am convinced that, as a matter of fact, everything regarding moral development of a human being has already been said or written in the history of human thought. Of course, everything that is really essential, because new problems are arising and new terminology is used to describe and analyze moral problems. And we can take these new aspects of morality into consideration. Nevertheless, I think it is possible to provide a synthetic explanation of moral development using philosophically grounded positions.

So, let’s start with an answer to the following question: what is identity?

The definition and structure of identity

Identity is what (who) someone is. My identity is what creates (constitutes) me; what is the source of my action, what explains and determines my behavior. Identity is what we need to know to understand and predict someone’s behavior.
Thus, the basic question is: what does identity consist of? What determines human action, what is its source?

Developmental psychology says that there are innate (inborn) and acquired traits of human nature and I suppose the same applies to identity. So identity has two elements (aspects): innate and acquired. This statement is taken from psychology; however, does philosophy affirm it as well? I think so. It will be clear when we take into consideration both: cognition and action of a human being. As for cognition, it is an obvious fact that the man is getting to know himself. He or she can have a better or worse self-concept. If that is the case, then we must distinguish between the following in human nature:

The subject that is both knowing and known;

The result of the process of knowing oneself, that is self-concept (knowledge about oneself; what I know or feel about myself);

The subject and self-concept are not identical, yet both affect the manner of human acting. Taking both factors into account is necessary and sufficient to explain this behavior. Although the terms: “innate identity” and “acquired identity” were not clearly addressed in earlier psychological literature, they seem important for better understanding of human development in the domain of morality as well. In this literature there are a lot of terms describing duality in a man. Consider the following examples:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author (Year)</th>
<th>Self (true self)</th>
<th>Self-concept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W. James (1892)</td>
<td>Self-as-knower</td>
<td>Self-as-known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pure ego</td>
<td>Empirical ego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subjective I</td>
<td>Objective self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. H. Mead (1934)</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. M. Symonds (1951)</td>
<td>Ego</td>
<td>Self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Erikson (1959)</td>
<td>Ego-aspect</td>
<td>Self-aspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. Bühler (1962)</td>
<td>Self as the core</td>
<td>Phenomenological self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. J. Hermans (1976)</td>
<td>Actual I</td>
<td>Symbolic I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Koestenbaum (1978)</td>
<td>Transcendental ego</td>
<td>Empirical ego</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, aim of this table is only to show duality in human nature (ego, identity) considered from different points of view. All authors agree that there are two aspects of the human nature, but disagree as for their features. Nevertheless – in general – we can say that there is essential, true, subjective I and its empirically perceptible image, sign or phenomenon.

In other words, subjective I is the capacity, tendency (active) to specific action, and self-concept is an image of that I, secondary to subjective I and to the reality in which it operates. The self-concept is a representation of one's abilities (possibilities), including one's values: what am I useful for; why do I live in this world? In conclusion we can say that there are two aspects of human identity discovered by analyzing the conditions and consequences of the process of knowing oneself. But there is also another path.
The second fact is: in that what is developing, there must be something unchangeable, permanent and persistent; which makes one constantly the same; and something variable, which enables the development. We can say in general that those elements are: innate and acquired. Then we must distinguish between the two sources – or levels – of human identity (two sources of one’s action). This distinction is based on the philosophical analysis of a developing being. In this being we must distinguish between unchangeable and changeable factors. Throughout all of its development, that being always remains the same and this is why it keeps its name. That is why we must agree that in a person there is a permanent and active nature (identity), which gives direction and a goal for their development. Besides, we must assume that in a person there is a second, changeable nature (identity); it is the result of knowing oneself; this is of unchangeable nature.

One conclusion results from both the facts, namely distinguishing what is:
- innate: this is, what I really am; set of capabilities for specific activities. This is what gradually reveals and updates itself during development,
- and what is acquired: this is what I think about myself; what I feel when I think about myself. This is how I perceive my capabilities, possibilities and potentials; what I believe to be available for me.

Individual propensities and capacities are originally inborn. And this is an unchangeable factor during a person’s development, giving direction to this process, deciding about keeping identity during the entire life-span. It is a set of abilities, which can be actualized to various degrees. It is a source of innate desires and aspirations, especially of the desire to practice possessed innate abilities and talents. Acquired is a self-concept; knowledge of reality and of oneself in it; that is the image of one’s propensities and capacities. Self-concept is a changeable factor during a person’s development. It is the system of knowledge, opinions, evaluations relating to oneself and a source of acquired desires: how a person describes their obligations, in what they see their happiness and in what way they want to use their abilities.

Summarizing we can say that the identity is the source of the action, and there are two sources of action: innate (unchangeable self) and acquired from environment (changeable self-concept). I suppose that invariable identity is the same as “subjective I” and changeable identity is the same as “objective I”, that is self-concept. How can we explain human behavior using those terms?

Functions of the innate and acquired identities

I assume that the knowing subject in a person is the same as the acting subject; this is the deepest motivational source of his or her action. Thus we can say that the subjective I (self) “speaks” (acts, becomes a reality and is becoming apparent) through the self-concept. Without the self-concept and the concept of the reality
around us there is nothing we can do. I cannot use the capacities I am not aware of; I can’t plan action for which they are needed. If I do not realize that I’m capable of doing something, this ability remains unused, but might cause some tension or distress, a feeling of lack of something undefined; insufficiency of my current actions (performance). That’s why it is possible to say: “I do not know, what I want” or: “I’m feeling bad, but I do not know why”. In general such feeling can be defined as a lack of freedom, authenticity and spontaneity.

The innate identity (self) designates all the human capacities, and the acquired identity (self-concept) actualizes or reveals some of them. The acquired identity, that is cognitive representation (schema) of reality and oneself against it, determines which of them will be disclosed. It is happening this way because understanding and behavior depend on the acquired cognitive schemas. These schemas decide on what a person pays their attention to and what he/she aims to do, based on the assessment of his or her abilities and the interpretation of his or her desires. In short, a man acts according to how he or she can see himself/herself. Conscious behavior inconsistent with the self-concept is not possible.

Acquired identity (self-concept) sets current goals of action, influences what individuals appreciate as good, that is as giving happiness and a feeling of high self-esteem. Their schemas (i.e., cognitive–affective structures) influence their knowing and acting; that is “guide how they perceive of, interpret, and respond to their social environment” (Hardy, Carlo, 2005, p. 244). So, people act according to their vision of themselves because “there is a natural human tendency to want to live consistent with one’s sense of self” (Hardy, Carlo, 2005, p. 235). For example, a positive self-concept influences positive behavior: “Attributional research has found that children given prosocial character attributions by caregivers are more likely to behave prosocially and thus act consistent with their attributed self-concept as prosocial individuals” (Hardy, Carlo, 2005, p. 243).

Self-concept, that is a cognitive scheme of oneself and reality, is directing human knowing and acting, and is developing by experience “and different types of experience cultivate different types of schemas. This holds true for moral schemas as well” (Narvaez, Lapsley, 2009, p. 257). Thus the schemas are the product of experience. How do they come into existence and what does the acquired identity depend on?

The formation of the acquired identity

Where can I take my self-concept from? How do I know who I am and what is my value? Only from the reactions of other persons to me. I can learn about myself only from what other people say about me that is on the basis of data provided by the environment. The man knows himself or herself only in contact with the environment. The man “in a state of limbo”, without contact with other
beings, wouldn’t know himself or herself, could not create the image of himself; he wouldn’t know who he or she is and what he or she should do.

The man can see himself or herself only in relation “to” and “for” something or someone. For example defining himself: “I am the man” is only possible thanks to an encounter with a woman; defining himself as tall – only when compared with shorter people and so on. It is not possible to define oneself as one is, without references to others, without comparisons with others and ignoring one’s social roles. The acquired identity is acquired from the environment, and therefore is relational, it depends on the environment; who I am: for..., towards...; compared with...; on the background...; in a relationship with...? Because there are „a lot of environments”, i.e. many people for whom I am someone specific, I can have a lot of self-concepts and see myself in different ways; I can feel and behave differently in different relationships. The image of oneself may be inconsistent, because one can have a lot of acquired identities (self-concepts), depending on different social contexts.

People enter in a lot of social relationships and that is why they possess multiple acquired identities. In different relationships, different contexts and dependencies are present (cf., Abrams 1994; Aquino, Reed, 2002), because the description of oneself is possible only through relationships with other people: who I am in relation to them. A person is a relational being, that is, determined only for and by other persons. Such other persons say to them – in different ways – who they are for them. By themselves alone, they cannot know it. Other people influence the convictions of what they should be as well. Therefore, a person has a lot of different self-concepts more or less truthful and making them more or less internally free. Knowing themselves and forming their self-concepts is accomplished through interactions with other people; we see ourselves in a social mirror. Without social confirmation (leastwise imaginary) of self-concept, a person could not perform their defined social role. Forming a permanent, consistent self-concept depends on a stable, permanent social reference system. Instead, in different social contexts we have a lot of different “I’s,” that is, self-concepts: “In recent years the trend has been towards thinking of the self as multidimensional [Harter, 1999]. Thus, not only is there a global sense of self, but individuals also have selves specific to certain domains (e.g., peer relationships, school, jobs, and athletics)” (Hardy, Carlo, 2005, p. 251). Social environment, therefore, influences identity, or – better – gives it: “A century of social psychological theory and research has demonstrated that identity is structured by culture, social class, and relationships [e.g. Baldwin, 1902; Mead, 1934]. If the notion of identity is to contribute to an understanding of moral functioning, then it must be a construct with deep roots in a social world” (Hart, 2005, p. 260). – That is why acquired identity may be in a permanent change: “identity is less an enduring achievement than an evolving construction (…) because as social context changes, so can moral identity” (Hart, 2005, p. 260).
It is possible then, that action consistent with one of those self-concepts may be inconsistent with another: “Scholars have noted that it is possible for individuals to act contrary to their sense of identity” (Hardy, Carlo, 2005, p. 245). When such a situation takes place, inner conflicts arise. This makes it evident that to form a correct identity we need an adequate environment. We need to meet people who know our innate identity and will help us to perceive and actualize it.

Our self-concepts, especially those concerning our value, depend on the significant persons in our life, on their opinions about us. There are a lot of self-concepts: as many as the number of important persons, towards whom it is necessary to take some position. And therefore the behavior inconsistent with one’s self-image is impossible; but inconsistent self-image (as a result of having many different significant persons) may lead to inconsistent behavior, i.e. the behavior in accordance with one of self-concepts might not be compatible with another. Hence the possibility of acting in defiance of oneself, that is evil action.

To summarize, we can say that identity is the source of activity; what’s more, there are two sources of action: innate and acquired. Self-concept is acquired and it determines the direction of the action and using of the possibilities contained in the innate identity. So far we have been discussing identity in general. What is moral identity like against such background?

The definition of moral identity

Moral identity is the source of moral action. The value of human acting depends on it. This is what makes the man a moral being as well as an object of moral evaluations. In the moral identity we should also distinguish between the inborn, unchangeable self and the acquired, changeable self-concept. Its aspects are: an innate capability of good (moral) actions, a sense of duty, a desire to receive and do what is good (worthy), and the acquired self-concept as someone with a specified value, useful for something or good at something (or not). Is it only a person describing themselves as good, worthy, e.g.: „I’m willing to help”; „I’m a blood donor”, „I’m fair”, „I’m honest” – who possesses moral identity? No, everyone with the ability to judge oneself, to notice some virtues or faults in oneself – possesses moral identity. The acquired moral identity is included in an answer to the following questions: what am I like: good or bad?; what is my value? Moral identity is nothing more than the values I identify with or I want to achieve. Then the moral identity has someone who says: “I am strong”, “I’m better than others”, “I am a winner”, „they did not catch me”, „I have more money than others” – etc. It’s about the situations in which someone can be proud of themselves even if he or she is a thief, murderer or deceiver. And if moral identity is what determines the moral behavior then everyone has it.
Could we say that someone who behaves immorally has immoral identity? Or that his identity is immoral? No, because everyone acts sometimes good and sometimes bad. Therefore, we can discuss with the authors, who argue that “one has a moral identity to the extent that moral notions, such as being good, being just, compassionate, or fair, is judged to be central, essential, and this one’s important self-understanding. One has a moral identity when one strives to keep faith with identity-defining moral commitments, and when the moral claims stake out the very terms of reference for the sort of person it claims to be” (Narvaez, Lapsley, 2009, p. 243).

I assume that everyone has some moral identity; it is part of his or her self-concept. Hence the conclusion: if a moral identity is a self-concept, that is an image, then it could be true or false; because the truth concerns the compatibility of two elements: the original and its image. This is consistent with inborn and acquired elements of identity. The acquired identity is the image of the innate one. To sum up, we can say that identity is the source of action and has two aspects: innate and acquired; the acquired identity – i.e. the self-concept – depends on the relations with the environment. Then moral identity also has two aspects. I will discuss them one by one, but first have a look at the problem of duality in conscience.

The structure of moral identity

The problem of moral development is not new in philosophy and psychology. Traditionally it is said that conscience is responsible for moral action. What is the relation between structure of moral identity and the structure of conscience? There are a lot of conceptions in history of human thought which suggested, that every man is divided into two distinct parts (aspects, features) but forming a single individual, a single unit, and a single entity. That means all humans have two closely related but very distinct sides of their being. When it is about a source of morality, medieval philosophy distinguished the synderesis and conscience.

Synderesis and conscience

Of course, there was not only one position in this matter; nevertheless for our purposes using the text from Encyclopaedia of Philosophy will be enough. According to it “synderesis” means

“innate principle in the moral consciousness of every person which directs the agent to good and restrains him from evil. (…) Bonaventura (…) makes the whole distinction between conscientia and synderesis rest upon the distinction between judgment and will. God (he says) has implanted a double rule of right in human nature: one for judging rightly, and this is the moral strength of conscience; another for right
volition, and this is the moral strength of synderesis, whose function is to dissuade from evil and stimulate to good, and which may therefore be described as the original moral tendency of (or? – TN) the disposition” (Internet. Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Synderesis).

As a comment I can say that – according to these words – there are two aspects in human conscience:

- The first – synderesis – is innate, comes from God, is the deepest source of good action, it causes that the man wants to be good and he wants to get good and not evil.
- The second – conscientia – is dependent on the rational judgement, then is something acquired.

It is obvious that the rational judgement may be less or more true or false, in addition it is acquired and dependent on the influence of advices from important persons. Generally speaking we can say that duality in sources of human morality was clear to some of Medieval philosophers too.

The second conception which distinguishes two aspects of human will is thought of French philosopher M. Blondel (1861-1949).

Conception of M. Blondel

As writes the historian of philosophy F. Copleston:

“Blondel makes a distinction between what he calls ‘the will-willing’ (la volonté voulante) and ‘the will-willed’ (la volonté voulue). The latter consists of distinct acts of volition. One wills first this, then that. The former, the will-willing, is «the movement which is common to every will». Blondel does not of course mean to imply that there are in man two wills. His contention is that there is in man a basic aspiration or movement (la volonté voulante) which expresses itself in willing distinct finite objects or ends but which can never be satisfied with any of them but reaches out beyond them. It is not itself the object of psychological introspection but rather the condition of all volitions or acts of will and at the same time that which lives and expresses itself in them and passes beyond them, as they are inadequate to it” (Copleston, 1994, p. 228).

Let’s then ask: what is relation between “synderesis” and “the will-willing” from one part and between “conscientia” and “will-willed” from the other? Can’t we notice the clear analogy here? I think that both: synderesis and willing-will are given “from above” and form general desires to be good, to be great, to be important, to be useful – and so on. It is basic source of every desires and actions. On the other hand conscientia and will-willed are dependent on knowledge and restricted.

It is possible to find similar distinguishing of two aspects of the conscience in the contemporary psychology.
Conception of E. Fromm

E. Fromm (1900-1980) writes that:
“The word conscience is used to express two phenomena which are quite distinct from each other. One is the „authoritarian conscience“ which is the internalized voice of an authority whom we are eager to please and afraid of displeasing. This authoritarian conscience is what most people experience when they obey their conscience. It is also the conscience which Freud speaks of, and which he called „Super-Ego.” This Super-Ego represents the internalized commands and prohibitions of father, accepted by the son out of fear. Different from the authoritarian conscience is the „humanistic conscience”; this is the voice present in every human being and independent from external sanctions and rewards. Humanistic conscience is based on the fact that as human beings we have an intuitive knowledge of what is human and inhuman, what is conducive of life and what is destructive of life. This conscience serves our functioning as human beings. It is the voice which calls us back to ourselves, to our humanity” (Fromm, 1984, p. 4).

In this text we can find analogical distinguishing. Humanistic conscience contains “intuitive knowledge” of what is good (that is human) and what is bad (that is inhuman). It is independent from influences of external environment. This voice speaks inside us: “be good!” or “do not be bad!” However authoritarian conscience is acquired from authorities who taught us what is good and what is bad. In this way our terminology is more differentiated: synderesis – willing-will and humanistic conscience from one part and conscience – will-willed and authoritarian conscience from the other. There are two aspects of human will (conscience) but three terms to denote them.

Let’s see now what terminology is used by C. G. Jung (1875-1961).

Conception of C. G. Jung

Jung discerns moral and ethical conscience. The first consists mainly in obedience and conformity to the social norms whilst ethical one represents “an inner voice, a Vox Dei whose authority lies in its unconscious character” (Rozuel, 2010, p. 38). Thus D. W. Robinson claims that:

“According to Jung, conscience is not fully reducible to socialization. Conscience expresses as well what Jung considered to be an innate, and potentially creative, moral disposition of the psyche. This form of conscience was understood by him as being comprised of a “moral reaction” arising from the unconscious (...)”, in conjunction with the rational scrutiny that this “moral reaction” prompts and, in a sense,
necessitates. Jung conceived of this “moral reaction” as a universal factor of the human psyche, “found on every level on human culture”. Jung contended that this inherited “moral reaction” is primordial driving force of our moral behavior” (Robinson, 2005, p. 20).

And next:
“To help make the distinction between moral experience governed primarily by the individual's instinct to conform to social mores and that which is impelled by a generative, autonomous inner agency, Jung differentiated, respectively, between the “moral” conscience and the “ethical” conscience. Jung describes the “moral” form of conscience as that which “appears when the conscious mind leaves the path of custom, of the mores, or suddenly recollects it.” In these cases “the moral” is synonymous with the “mores,” and conscience reflects primarily an instinctive desire to conform to the norms and expectations of one's social group and a corresponding aversion to whatever is new. Such expression of conscience are accorded the designation of ‘moral conscience’” (Robinson 2005, p. 21).

Summarizing we can say that once again we have here described two aspects of conscience. The first – ethical – represents archetypical Vox Dei in a man, is his or her “inner voice”. It forms “deepest foundations of the personality” (Jung, 1970, para. 856); is “innate, and potentially creative, moral disposition of the psyche” and “primordial driving force of our moral behavior”, while the second aspect of conscience is “reducible to socialization” and is conformed “to the norms and expectations of one's social group.” – Then it is acquired.

As we could see, it is not difficult to discern once more two aspect of moral identity: innate and acquired. They are described in the literature but different authors use different terms to designate them. Nevertheless, it is possible to arrange elements of this jigsaw puzzle in a coherent image of the identity. Let us now discuss more precisely what is innate in human morality.

The inborn moral identity

It seems to me, that the best philosophy to explain problem of moral identity would be the philosophy of eudaimonism. According to that ethical system
„Individuals have a responsibility to recognize and live in accordance with their daimon or «true self.» The daimon refers to the potentialities of each person, the realization of which represents the greatest fulfillment in living of which each is capable. The daimon is an ideal in the sense of being an excellence, a perfection toward which one strives and, hence, it can give meaning and direction to one’s life. The potentialities comprising the daimon can be interpreted as including both one’s
aptitudes and talents and one’s purposes in living. The efforts a person makes to live in accordance with the daimon, to realize those potentials, can be said to be personally expressive” (Waterman, 1990, p. 39-40).

The central term in this philosophy is the conception of daimon or “true self”. Is this inborn or acquired? If I have to recognize it, then it can’t be acquired, it must be given from the beginning of human life. But every conscious goal or ideal in human life is acquired from environment. The meaning and direction of this life depends on upbringing and important persons in one’s life. Here we are in a very important point of our deliberations: ideal is inside us or apart from us? My answer is: both here and here. And that’s why there are two aspects of our moral identity. In this context let’s consider next statement of Waterman:

“If one is engaged in a process of self-discovery, the task at hand is to “find oneself.” That which is to be found is something that already exists – and the task is to recognize and understand it. Discovery is the process of making the unknown known. If a “true self” exists prior to its discovery, then this true self can serve as a standard for what should be considered “better” identity choices. Better choices are ones consistent with, and expressive of, one’s true nature” (Waterman, 2011, p. 358).

Author clearly says that “true self” exists from the beginning and needs discovery. Then we must admit that there are in us inborn goals and ideals. We must discover them and live according to them. This is the only way to be really moral. Generally speaking,

“Waterman (1993) suggests that as young persons develop their sense of identity an important aspect is finding a “guiding vision” for their life. To examine how people find this vision, he looks to the philosophy of eudaimonism, which posits that people are called to “recognize and live in accordance with the daimon or ‘true self’” (p. 150). This idea of a “true self” involves the search for one essential or unchanging part and is thus similar to the essentialist style of self-continuity reasoning” (Allen, 2009, p. 13-14).

I fully agree with this position. But the main purpose of my article is not propagating the eudaimonism, but the synthetic description of the structure of the moral identity. Then let’s notice that we have here one more term to describe the duality in human morality: synderesis, the will-willing, humanistic conscience, ethical conscience, daimon and true self from the first side and conscience, will-willed, authoritarian conscience and moral conscience from the second. The first is given, the second needs shaping.

At this point it is good to refer to Maslow’s concept of an inner nature in man. The basic assumptions of this point of view are:
1. We have, each of us, an essential biologically based inner nature, which is to some degree “natural,” intrinsic, given, and, in a certain limited sense, unchangeable, or, at least, unchanging. (…)

4. This inner nature, as much as we know of it so far, seems not to be intrinsically or primarily or necessarily evil. The basic needs (for life, for safety and security, for belongingness and affection, for respect and self-respect, and for self-actualization), the basic human emotions and the basic human capacities are on their face either neutral, pre-moral or positively “good.”

5. Since this inner nature is good or neutral rather than bad, it is best to bring it out and to encourage it rather than to suppress it. If it is permitted to guide our life, we grow healthy, fruitful, and happy” (Maslow, 1962, p. 3).

I fully accept this point of view. This inner nature in man is no other than an inborn moral identity or “true self”. It is unchangeable, good and active. It is the deepest source of our desires and ground for every motivation. This nature “is continually speaking” in us: “be good, be respectable, be great and attain something valuable!” It is the good which is in us and which “wants” to be manifested, to be freed, and expressed in human action. It is a basis for development, also for moral development. Every man is good, deep inside, and feels an inner inclination towards acting in a way that is appreciated as “good” or “valuable”. It is the ability to act in a good, moral way; the “active” and motivating ability and desire. Hence the desire to be good, present in all our conscious life, which is an urge to be great, admired, valued, needed, loved and so on. Everyone wants to be highly appreciated and we long for a sense of self-worth.

This aspect of identity is always unchangeable and inalienable. Thanks to it a man focuses on good, longs for good. The only thing that changes is the idea of what is good and thus the hierarchy of values (the will-willed). The man cannot possibly want to be bad, that is to be worthless, pointless, unnecessary, worse and worse, stupid, dumb, weak and the like. If the inner nature was not good, the development would not be good either and it would not be worth promoting. And because the inner nature is good, therefore, each man wants to have self-esteem, everyone wants to be considered as good, to be respected and appreciated. That’s why striving for self-esteem: “I am good” is the primary motive of human action. The source of the pursuit of self-esteem is an innate sense of the good (values) in oneself (the recognition of oneself as good and valuable) and the desire to express (actualize) that good; that is nothing else as desire to be appreciated. Using ethical terms, we can define such internal moral nature of a man as his/her conscience. It is emphasized in the psychological writings. E. Fromm, for example, claims that: “Conscience is thus a re-action of ourselves to ourselves. It is the voice of our true selves which summons us back to ourselves, to live productively, to develop fully and harmoniously – that is, to become what we potentially are. It is the guardian of our integrity” (1947/2002, p. 159). And next: “The goal of humanistic conscien-
ce is productiveness and, therefore, happiness, since happiness is the necessary concomitant of productive living” (Fromm, 1947/2002, p. 160).

Although Fromm also writes that “humanistic conscience represents not only the expression of our true selves; it contains also the essence of our moral experiences in life” (p. 159), which excludes an inborn character of conscience, nevertheless in his words we can find a description of a lot of innate aspects of human conscience. For example “voice of our true selves” is inborn, not acquired from environment. Thus there is in us general striving for good and the desire of well-being and the initial grasp of what is good; i.e. general conviction (feeling) that there is good and evil. Thanks to it we are sensitive to both good and evil.

Due to the good that is in us we are able to know good, we can evaluate whether what we see and experience is consistent with what is already in us or not. There is something great in us and therefore we want achievements and greatness. We want to leave something important and good behind us. It is a practical basic developmental task for every age.

If it were initially no good in us, we wouldn’t be able to do moral evaluations; it would be no difference to us, what is happening with us. The man has some inborn desire. This is the desire to feel and realize his or her own values, i.e. the sense of his or her life; desire to be someone worthy and achieve something important. This is the inherent aspect of moral identity. So what is acquired?

The acquired moral identity

A person is a specified double; inside: through their abilities and “mission to the world” depending on them and on the outside: through social relations and functions shaping their self-concept. Innate identity is the primary, deepest source of moral action (of the desire to be good), and acquired identity contains, among others, the concept of things which are good: this is secondary one.

The acquired moral identity is self-concept connected with values and feelings and a similar concept of reality. It contains self-esteem, hierarchy of values, opinions on what is good (important, valuable) and assessment of one’s own capabilities and achievements in this regard. It includes answers to the questions: what is my value? What does my value consists in and how can I have it more? It is acquired, learned knowledge about good and evil. It comes with education and experience. This is not so much the “rational” but “emotional” knowledge and it is related to the actions of other people towards me – to how they treat me. These are emotions (positive or negative) associated with each of the valuable or moral objects in experienced reality.

The innate moral identity is a desire to achieve (accomplish) something valuable, and the acquired moral identity is an interpretation of one’s own desires, that is acquired concept of happiness: “what I want”, “what I consider good”. This
is knowledge about what enhances self-esteem; what meets our needs; what one believes to be a valuable, worthy endeavor. This is a notion of what is good (desirable and valuable). Acquired moral identity is an element of human cognitive realm (sphere). This is a desirable style of living, in other words, the hierarchy of values; Freud’s superego or Fromm’s authoritative conscience; a set of objectives: “Authoritarian conscience is concerned with man's obedience, self-sacrifice, duty, or his “social adjustment”” (Fromm, 1947/2002, p. 159-160). – All these elements depend on environment and therefore are acquired.

Now let’s move to the subject of developing moral identity.

Shaping of the acquired moral identity

Moral identity comes from relationships with other people, thus it is shaped by changes in these relationships. At first I will consider the manner of the forming of acquired identity and then the need for the suitable environment and the influence of own decisions.

The origin of acquired moral identity

The hierarchy of values is derived from “valuable” or “moral” experience. We consider objects (persons, situations, events, actions and relationships) which evoked our positive emotions as valuable. These reactions create an image of self-worth in a person experiencing them. Through these reactions, one learns what is worth striving for; what is considered good by an environment; what is admired, appreciated, sought and what should be avoided (what is considered bad: rejected, neglected, badly seen, harmful) - and a person assesses himself or herself against such background: whether they have what is considered valuable in their environment. The acquired identity is the result of the environment responding to the question: what is my value and what should I do to improve it? What has some value and how can I achieve this value? The answers to these questions guide human will (desire, action).

Then this aspect of identity is changeable and variable, because during his life a man sets himself or herself various goals. These problems are addressed in the theory of developmental tasks by R. J. Havighurst or D. J. Levinson. It is obvious that for the creation of a positive self-concept, which is conducive to morality, it is necessary to have close relationships with a “positive” environment. Self-assessment, the opinion of oneself and of one’s values, is obtained from environment’s reactions: positive (love, admiration, esteem) or negative (disregard, neglect, contempt, hatred). Of course, this is more of a feeling here rather than a mere verbal description. What is important for a person depends on these reactions. If these
reactions are positive, then it will be easy to have a positive self-concept and – as a consequence – moral behavior, for example in a school:

“Payne et al. (2003) showed that when a school is organized and experienced as a caring community, its students report higher levels of bonding to school and greater internalization of community goals and norms which are related to less delinquency. Elementary school children's sense of community leads them to adhere to the values that are most salient in the classroom (Solomon et al., 1996). At the same time, when high school students perceive a moral atmosphere they report more prosocial norms-and less transgressive behaviour (Brugman et al., 2003). These findings show that secure attachments promote forced compliance and lead to internalization of norms and standards at every age” (Narvaez, Lapsley, 2009, p. 252).

What follows from this is that the basis for promoting moral development is creating really moral, helpful environment. Supporting moral identity development consists in providing moral environment for children: “Children with warm, responsive parents build positive prosocial schemas about relating to others that they apply to future relationships; children with community service experience, build self-efficacy in schemas of helping others, leading them to continue the practice as adults” (Narvaez, Lapsley, 2009, p. 256).

So the change of the morality consists in the change of the acquired moral identity. It is necessary to see oneself as someone who is valuable and wants to attain more value. Thus the acquired identity consists in describing oneself as - for example – good, punctual, fair, and setting goals or purposes for oneself: what I want to be like; how I want to see myself; how I want to be regarded by other people. So understanding a man's behavior largely depends on understanding the goals he sets himself, and these goals depend on the values he acknowledges. The values, in turn, depend on the environment in which he or she grew up, and on significant persons – and on what they valued. It shapes the acquired moral identity.

A man behavior follows his or her self-concept, so – if we want to create a positive moral identity in him/her – we should provide him/her with a positive and really moral image of himself or herself. So the most important factor of moral development is “moral” environment.

The need for a proper environment

The acquired moral identity is something relational: one can have value only for someone else. I can’t admire or underestimate myself if significant others do not admire or underestimate me. The value is always the value for someone. And to be a value for someone means to be in close relation with him or her. Some authors point this out clearly:
«Foundation of self-control, integrity, and moral desires is deeply relational. Moral self-identity emerges within a history of secure attachment» (Lapsley, 2008, p. 44).

«Our identity is defined by reference to things that have significance for us. Moreover, according to Taylor (1989), it is a basic human aspiration to be connected to something of crucial importance, something considered good, worthy, and of fundamental value; and this orientation to the good “is essential to being a functional moral agent” (Taylor, 1989, p. 42). Hence, the modern ethical theory draws a tight connection between personhood, identity, and moral agency» (Narvaez, Lapsley, 2009, p. 240).

I would like to add that, of course, “our identity is defined by reference to things that have significance for us” but more important to our identity are relations with persons that have significance for us. These relationships can be expressed through the use of the term “self-concept”. In any case, it is the key to properly describing a moral process. Everyone wants to have the image of oneself as someone worthy. But the problem is that it is impossible to give high self-esteem to oneself. If we want to have one, it is necessary to seek, to try to gain someone’s recognition for us. The source of self-esteem is the recognition received from a significant person. What’s more, everyone wants to be good, that is to have a good reputation about oneself (it is innate), but nobody has the innate knowledge of what is good. Therefore, ethical education is needed; not only by teaching, but rather by example and close relation: «The developmental source of the moral personality lies in the shared, positive affective relationship with caregivers» (Narvaez, Lapsley, 2009, p. 252).

The problem is when there are a lot of important persons with different hierarchy of values, for example parents and peer group. Lack of one most important person causes the lack of a distinct, stable identity. Then a man can say: “I don’t know who I am”; “I don’t know what I should do and what I need”. There are a lot of selves: «McAdams has identified the main issue for young adulthood as the problem of multiple selves» (Higgins – D’Alessandro, 2006, p. 5).

Thus, forming of the “right” acquired identity is tantamount to choosing the “right” significant person or groups: who I want to appeal to, whose recognition I want to win, for whom I want to live, who I want to accommodate myself to, whom I want to impress, by whom I want to be valued, and the like. And if the hierarchy of values of my important person becomes my own hierarchy of values, then the faithfulness to oneself is largely tantamount to the faithfulness to this person. But who will be my significant person – is totally my free decision. I choose who this “very important person” for me will be.
The influence of one’s own decisions

The self-concept develops and is enhanced by behavior in accordance with this concept. And my self-concept is created in the relation with the person that is important to me. This person determines my self-concept. I know and act, as well as simply live, through this self-concept. If my behavior is not consistent with this person, that is with my self-concept created in close relationship with them, then I’m in disagreement with myself. Such a situation is uncomfortable. That’s why we shouldn’t have a lot of important persons of differing hierarchies of values. The disagreement between their respective value systems causes our own internal disagreement. In other words, our acquired identity is inconsistent, disturbed or cracked. We have an internal tendency toward self-consistency, then: “the transition from a judgment of responsibility to action is supported dynamically by the tendency toward self-consistency, a central tendency in personality organization” (Blasi, 1983, p. 201).

What is “tendency toward self-consistency” if not tendency toward agreement or unity with the most important person? A person important to me is the person, in the relation with whom I see myself. This is the person, who influences my self-concept the most. So, a man acts morally because: “not to act according to one’s judgment should be perceived as a substantial inconsistency, as a fracture within the very core of the self, unless neutralizing devices are put into operation” (Blasi, 1983, p. 201).

Other authors comment on these words as follows:

“Blasi suggests that the cognitive motivation for moral action springs from this sense of fidelity to oneself-in-action. It springs from a tendency toward self-consistency, which he views as a cognitive motive for objectivity and truth. It springs from a moral identity that is deeply rooted in moral commitments - commitments so deeply rooted, in fact, that to betray these commitments is also to betray the self” (Narvaez, Lapsley, 2009, p. 242). – These “moral commitments” are impossible without important persons and “neutralizing devices” consists in getting the authority back from this important person: “he/she doesn't know a lot about it”.

The same thought is expressed in a similar way:

“Blasi (2004) suggest suggestion that the motivation for moral action does not spring directly from a cognition, but rather from a deeply felt sense of fidelity to oneself in action. It springs from a moral identity that is deeply rooted in moral commitments - commitments so deeply rooted, in fact, that is betray them is to betray the self” (Lapsley, 2008, p. 33).

Thus, shaping of the identity consists in striving for the appropriate environment. At first it is a family that fulfils this task, later a man alone chooses the company he or she values most and wants to accommodate himself or herself to. And so the forming of the moral identity is accomplished through the interaction
between the environment and one’s own decisions and choices. The environment creates conditions for the moral development, it provides the set of values, attitudes, models to imitate and the individual makes his or her choice. In this choice he or she is free, although remains under various influences. In any case forming of the identity is effected by the choice of the environment:

“Caring and supportive family environment can facilitate the development of morality and identity, and the integration of the two into moral identity. Additionally, involvement in religious and youth organizations can provide not only moral beliefs systems, but opportunities to act on those beliefs (e.g., through community involvement), which can aid their integration into identity” (Hardy, 2008, p. 291).

Acting in accordance with one’s norms – if approved by the environment – reinforces this identity because it reinforces the self-concept. Self-concept is both a source (second cause) of action and its consequence. A person acts according to their self-concept, but the results of this action modify their self-concept. Causal relation between acquired identity and action is bilateral (mutual), it gives feedback. A lot of authors notice this fact; for example:

“It is possible that relations between moral identity and moral behavior are bidirectional in that involvement in moral action influences moral identity formation, and moral identity subsequently acts as a source of moral motivation and commitment” (Hardy, Carlo, 2005, p. 244).

“From a developmental perspective, one would propose that moral actions lead to moral identity, which in turn promotes further moral actions” (Youniss, Yates, 1999, p. 373).

Every action, then, influences the self-concept and is developmental only when it flows from a conviction of what is good and serves to verify it. In this way it is possible to correct the self-concept that is the development of acquired moral identity. A person progressively gets knowledge of what is good for them. Then, everyone who approves my behavior reinforces the identity which is its source. And if my decisions are approved by the environment, especially by significant persons, then their positive reaction strengthens the identity from which these decisions come: “I want to be like that”, because this gives me the high self-esteem.

We can, therefore, see that moral identity is formed by two factors: proper (moral) environment and proper (moral) decisions. Both these factors have impact on actualisation of possibilities determined by inner nature of a man. Two aspects of identity are sources of human morality.

Let us see now, how against this background the problem of the evil looks.

I have said earlier that inner nature of a man is always good, then where from misdeeds come? If inner nature is unchangeable, then evil can be only in self-concept that is in acquired aspect of moral identity. Our self-concept can be more or less false. From the “true self” comes an appeal or demand: “be good!”, “be great!” while concept of this goodness or greatness comes from environment and is
a part of self-image. That concept can be false. For example, there are people, who want to become great through humiliating other. “True self” causes that everyone wants to have high self-esteem, but that self-esteem can be achieved by aggression or using drugs. Of course, it is only momentary and deceptive but there are people using these ways in order to feel great and important at least for a moment.

Conclusion

The article explains moral development showing the difference between innate and acquired aspects of moral identity. It was the fundamental assumption, that there are two identities (or: two aspects of identity) in a man: inborn (self) and acquired (self-concept). There are a lot of philosophers and researches who hold that moral identity is dual so this statement can be considered reliable and true. This assumption was justified by philosophical analysis of human knowing and acting. In both cases we can discern two causes: unchangeable and changeable, that is innate self and acquired self-concept.

Moral Identity consists of the innate desire for good (values) and the acquired concept of what is good (valuable). The acquired identity comes from the relationship with the environment and from its reactions to the individual. When these reactions are positive, then they form positive self-concept in this individual and are causes of his or her positive, moral actions. Of course, a man is free and he or she can choose for himself or herself such environment in which expects to reach the highest self-esteem (the most positive self-concept). In this way he or she has an impact on their own development.

It is noteworthy that such a theory is useful in various fields of psychology. As regards developmental psychology, it is commonly accepted that there are inborn and acquired traits in human development. We can next move to social psychology, saying that acquired identity depends on social context. And if we assume that self-concept is a crucial factor for human acting, then we have common language with psychology of personality. And, what's more, faithfulness to oneself is one of the main problems of ethics and psychology of morality. In this way a synthetic vision of human identity and development is achieved. The basic idea was to find two factors in human nature, to describe their function and then show that two aspects of moral identity are sources of morality.

References


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